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The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure 
A. Benjamin Spencer* 
"The courts are established to administer justice, and you 
cannot have justice if justice is constantly being thwarted 
and turned aside or delayed by a labyrinth of technical 
entanglements. "1 
Those of us who study civil procedure are familiar with the notion 
that federal civil procedure under the 1938 Rules was generally char­
acterized by a "liberal ethos," meaning that it was originally designed 
to promote open access to the courts and to facilitate a resolution of 
disputes on the merits.2 Most of us are also aware of the fact that the 
reality of procedure is not always access-promoting or fixated on mer­
its-based resolutions as a priority. Indeed, I would say that a "restric­
tive ethos" prevails in procedure today, with many rules being 
developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. I would like 
to thank those who were able to give helpful comments on the piece, especially Stephen Bur­
bank, Richard Marcus, Laurence Solum, Laurens Walker, and Lonny Hoffman. I would also 
like to thank the participants in a presentation of this piece at the University of Illinois College 
of Law and at the DePaul University College of Law. 
1 Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States: Hearing on H.R. 
8892 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 2 (1938) (statement of Homer Cum­
mings, Att'y Gen. of the United States). 
2 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure, 86 CowM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986) (" Sobered by the fate of the Field Code, Dean Clark 
and the other drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system that would 
install what may be labelled the 'liberal ethos,' in which the preferred disposition is on the mer­
its, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery."). 
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ability of claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on 
the merits in federal court.3 In this Essay, after discussing some of the 
familiar components of the liberal ethos of civil procedure, I hope to 
set forth some of the aspects of federal civil procedure that reflect the 
restrictive ethos, following up with some thoughts on whether a dia­
lectical analysis4 can help us understand the nature of the relationship 
between civil procedure's liberal and restrictive components. 
I. The Liberal Ethos 
The liberal ethos in civil procedure generally refers to those as­
pects of federal procedure that tend to promote access and merits­
based or accurate resolutions of civil disputes.5 That the Federal 
Rules were originally designed to promote access cannot be denied. 
The very notion of uniformity itself was an innovation designed to 
make the civil justice system more accessible to litigants.6 Also pro­
moting the vision of open access espoused by the drafters was the in­
troduction of simplified "notice pleading," which was designed to 
minimize greatly the number of cases dismissed on the pleadings.7 
With notice pleading replacing the cumbersome and "archaic fact­
pleading[, m]ore people with legal grievances could gain entry into the 
system."8 In many respects, the commitment to access endures; for 
example, the current post-1993 version of Rule 11-with its safe-har­
bor provision, emphasis on deterrence, and allowance for innovative 
legal arguments-was meant to complement simplified pleading by 
3 I have noted the advent of a restrictive ethos in civil procedure in a previous writing. A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 479-83 (2008) (suggesting that a 
move away from notice pleading represented "the latest and perhaps final chapter in a long saga 
that has moved the federal civil system from a liberal to a restrictive ethos"). 
4 By dialectical analysis I mean an attempt to resolve the apparent contradictions be­
tween the components of the liberal ethos and the restrictive ethos to determine whether there is 
indeed a cooperative relationship between the two that can be understood as their synthesis. 
5 See id. at 479. 
6 A uniform nationwide system of procedure facilitated the development of litigators who 
could handle cases across the country, which in turn made it a much simpler matter for party 
litigants to retain competent counsel to represent their cause in the federal courts. Uniformity 
likely reduced the costs of federal litigation (at least initially), given that less time and effort had 
to be spent identifying applicable local procedural rules or retaining a local specialist who could 
help navigate those rules. 
7 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). 
8 Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 
25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341, 356-57 (1990). Recent developments on the pleading front­
which call into question the idea of notice pleading and portend an era of more scrutinous re­
view of pleadings-are discussed below in Part II as an element of the restrictive ethos. 
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ensuring truthful allegations without deterring litigants from asserting 
what some may view as tenuous claims.9 
The innovation of modern discovery ushered in by the rules fur­
ther promoted access by enabling plaintiffs to initiate their claims 
without having to have full and complete information. Relatedly, de­
laying the test of the factual sufficiency of one's claim until after dis­
covery is completed10 is supposed to give plaintiffs sufficient ability to 
investigate their claims under the aegis of the courts rather than prior 
to filing. Liberal joinder rules, as well as the class-action device, have 
promoted access by enabling parties with substantially related claims 
to prosecute together claims that they might otherwise have been una­
ble to sustain individually.11 
That the Federal Rules were originally imbued with a clear pref­
erence for merits-based, accurate resolutions of disputes is also clear. 
Simplified pleading12 and broad discovery13 were designed to promote 
resolution of disputes on the substantive merits as opposed to proce-
9 See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.03 (3d ed. 2009) 
("The 1993 amendments . . .  clarified and liberalized the standard for complying with Rule 11."). 
10 This postponement of judgment day until after discovery is facilitated in part by Rule 
56(f), which provides: 
If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it 
cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: 
(1) deny the motion; 
(2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be 
taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or 
(3) issue any other just order. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 56(f). It must be noted, however, that to the extent plaintiffs are required to 
offer specific facts prior to discovery under the rule of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 
1955, 1964-65 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)-the Supreme 
Court's most recent pleading decisions-this traditional allowance may be eroding. Twombly's 
and Iqbal's contribution to the restrictive ethos is discussed below. See infra notes 46-49, 82-86 
and accompanying text. 
11 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 809 (1985) ("[T]his lawsuit involves 
claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in 
court if a class action were not available."); Deposit Guar. Nat'! Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 
338 (1980) ("The use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer 
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to bring cases that for eco­
nomic reasons might not be brought otherwise."). Further, requiring plaintiffs to opt-out rather 
than opt-in for damages in class actions facilitates access because plaintiffs in such cases with 
meager individual claims would otherwise be much less likely to participate in and enjoy the 
fruits of a class-action suit. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397-98 (1967) 
("[R]equiring the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in the lawsuit would result in 
freezing out the claims of people-especially small claims held by small people-who for one 
reason or another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal matters, will simply 
not take the affirmative step."). 
12 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U. S. 506, 514 (2002) ("The liberal notice pleading of 
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dural technicalities.14 Liberal amendment rules permit parties to cure 
errors or omissions by amending their pleadings to add claims, de­
fenses, or parties as necessary.15 The motion for judgment as a matter 
of law,16 the motion for new trial,17 and the motion for relief from 
judgment18 each provide litigants with an opportunity to seek a just, 
accurate resolution of their cause where the conclusion of the jury 
seems clearly inconsistent with the truth. Judicial discretion is rooted 
in the concern that disputes be resolved on their merits rather than 
procedural technicalities, resulting in a group of civil rules that permit 
judges to exercise significant discretion in the interest of justice.19 The 
disinclination of courts toward default judgments20 further indicates 
the preference for merits-based judgments over those obtained 
through procedural technicalities.21 
Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litiga­
tion on the merits of a claim."). 
13 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 
52 ALA. L. REv. 529, 535-36 (2001) ("'Fishing expeditions' were to be allowed in the interests of 
developing facts in a relatively efficient way so that legal disputes could be determined in light of 
maximum factual information. "); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Histori­
cal Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 697-700 (1998); see 
also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts 
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."); In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 
F.3d 1059, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("An overriding interest in the revelation of truth creates a 
need for free and open access to evidence . . . .  "). By not making admissibility as evidence the 
standard for discoverability, and not requiring leave of the court to take depositions (both a 
result of the 1946 amendments to the Federal Rules), discovery was broadened beyond its initial 
scope. See Subrin, supra, at 736-37. The 1970 amendments went further in that direction by 
making insurance policies discoverable, eliminating the good-cause requirement for document 
production, permitting the discovery of expert witnesses and their supporting materials, and pro­
viding sanctions for noncompliance with one's discovery obligations. See Stempel, supra, at 
540-41. 
14 To reinforce the notice-pleading standard, Rule 8(e) indicates: "Pleadings must be con­
strued so as to do justice." FED. R. Crv. P. 8(e). 
15 FED. R. Crv. P. 15(a)(2) (providing that courts "should freely give leave [to amend 
pleadings] when justice so requires"). 
16 FED. R. Crv. P. 50. 
17 FED. R. Crv. P. 59. 
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 60. 
19 JAY TrnMARSH & RoGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LmGATION: PROBLEMS IN AD­
VANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-7 (2002); see, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 15 (delineating the conditions 
under which a court may allow a party to amend or supplement its pleadings); 28 U. S.C. § 1404 
(2006) (permitting a court to transfer a civil action to another venue "in the interest of justice"). 
20 See, e.g., Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ("[D]efault judg­
ments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in 
extreme situations."); Katzson Bros. v. EPA, 839 F.2d 1396, 1399 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating "de­
fault judgments are not favored by courts"). 
21 See Pulliam v. Pulliam, 478 F.2d 935, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that in the context of a 
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To the above-mentioned attributes of access and accuracy I would 
add another value to which the Federal Rules have generally aspired: 
the promotion of private efficiency and inexpensiveness. Indeed, a 
core value embodied in much of procedural law is the promotion of 
the efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes between parties.22 
Notice pleading permits litigants to assert claims without incurring the 
delay and expense that would accompany an obligation to plead de­
tailed facts.23 The obligation under Rule 12 to consolidate or waive 
certain preliminary procedural challenges is at least intended to pre­
vent dilatory tactics to some extent.24 Initial disclosures-added to 
the Rules in 1993-were designed to save litigants the cost and hassle 
of having to pry such information from their adversaries,25 while the 
compelled-discovery system in general, coupled with the American 
rule requiring responding parties to cover their own discovery ex­
penses, permits plaintiffs to have formal access26 to relevant informa­
tion from defendants without ordinarily having to cover the expense 
of production.27 
In shaping the scope of an action, the broad joinder rules28 are 
designed to permit the action to be crafted in a way that permits most 
related claims to be litigated together, an innovation away from the 
default judgment "a court should liberally allow relief under" Rule 60(b) because "a resolution 
on the merits is preferable to a judgment by default"). 
22 FED. R. C1v. P. 1 (establishing that the Federal Rules "should be construed and admin­
istered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding"). 
23 Cf 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO­
CEDURE: CrvIL § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) ("The relevant facts may be determined by discovery . ... 
The only function left to be performed by the pleadings alone is that of notice." (footnote 
omitted)). 
24 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g)-(h). 
25 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendments ("[T]he experi­
ence of the few state and federal courts that have required pre-discovery exchange of core infor­
mation such as is contemplated in Rule 26(a)(l) indicates that savings in time and expense can 
be achieved . ... "). 
26 The term "formal access" is used here in distinction from "practical access," with the 
former concept reflecting the provision in the rules for the compelled exchange of all relevant 
information and the latter describing the ability actually to obtain desired materials through 
discovery. 
21 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting that "[u]nder 
[discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of comply­
ing with discovery requests"). Recent electronic-discovery reforms-creating the prospect that a 
requesting party might have to shoulder some of the expense of production where hard-to-re­
cover electronically stored information is involved-represent a move in the restrictive direction 
discussed below. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (permitting a court to set forth conditions for 
the discovery of electronically stored information from inaccessible sources). 
28 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("Under the Rules, the 
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rigidity of the common-law pleading system.29 The compulsory-coun­
terclaim rule is an example of not only permitting the assertion of 
related claims within a single action but compelling it: "The require­
ment that counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occur­
rence as the opposing party's claim 'shall' be stated in the pleadings 
was designed to prevent multiplicity of actions and to achieve resolu­
tion in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of common mat­
ters. "30 Of course, supplemental jurisdiction supports this liberal 
joinder system by allowing jurisdictionally insufficient claims to be 
heard in federal court on the basis of their relationship with other 
claims in the action.31 In sum, claim and party joinder have as their 
principal rationale the avoidance of multiple lawsuits pertaining to 
similar and closely related matters, something which in most instances 
promotes the private economic interests of litigants.32 We see, then, 
that the liberal ethos favors access to courts, resolution of disputes on 
their merits, and the inexpensive and timely prosecution and defense 
of claims. 
II. The Restrictive Ethos 
Although the values that comprise the liberal ethos-access, ac­
curacy, and private efficiency-are familiar, they may seem quaint to 
the practitioner or serious student of civil procedure. Not that these 
values were not in view of the drafters of the Rules or do not reflect 
some part of their nature today; rather, it turns out that there are ad­
ditional values that animate civil procedure, albeit in a contrary man­
ner than those of the liberal ethos. These counter-values, if you will, 
form what I refer to as the restrictive ethos in civil procedure. 
impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to 
the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." (footnote omitted)). 
29 Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952) ("Rules 13 and 14 
are both intended to avoid circuity of action and to dispose of the entire subject matter arising 
from one set of facts in one action, thus administering complete and evenhanded justice expedi­
tiously and economically."); see also Lasa per L'Industria de! Marmo Societa per Azioni v. Alex­
ander, 414 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir. 1969) ("The words 'transaction or occurrence' are given a 
broad and liberal interpretation in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits."). 
30 S. Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U. S. 57, 60 (1962) (per curiam). The quoted "shall" lan­
guage of Rule 13(a) was replaced with the thought-to-be-more-modem "must" as part of the 
restyling amendments that took effect December 1, 2007. 
31 See Michelle S. Simon, Defining the Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1367: A Hearty Welcome to Permissive Counterclaims, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 295, 298 
(2005) ("[ S]upplemental jurisdiction promotes fairness and judicial economy, and complements 
the liberal joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). 
32 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRAC­
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1652 (3d ed. 2001). 
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The major counter-value within the restrictive ethos is a thresh­
old skepticism that yields an interest in excluding or discouraging 
claims rather than supporting and encouraging them. The open-access 
approach of the Federal Rules was not a welcome development in the 
eyes of all observers.33 Many jurists, particularly after the strengthen­
ing of the damages-class device under Rule 2334 and the stream of 
public-rights legislation in the 1960s, felt that too many meritless 
claims were flooding the courts: "Relatively low barriers to entry have 
. . .  generated an undesirable result-a deluge of frivolous or vexa­
tious claims filed by the uninformed, the misinformed, and the unscru­
pulous. "35 The response was a so-called "counterrevolution"36 that 
asserted that "the underlying ideology of liberality of pleading, wide­
open discovery and attorney latitude was no longer feasible"37 and 
sought to use procedural reforms to "keep out the worthless, the triv­
ial, and those litigations which . . .  ought not to be in the courts[.]"38 
Specifically, as a solution to the litigation explosion and perceived 
abuses of discovery and the civil process in general, this group of re­
formers promulgated a series of rule changes and practices that sought 
to clamp down on frivolous filings. 
33 See, e.g. , Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 
79, 85 (2006) ("Rule S's near elimination of any meaningful requirement that plaintiffs initially 
apprise the court of a basis for relief provoked judicial hostility from the very beginning."). In 
1952 the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference voiced this hostility by adopting a resolution propos­
ing that Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to read, "(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief, which statement shall contain the facts constituting a cause 
of action." Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a) (2) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1953). 
34 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
35 Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see also Selvy v. 
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 371 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908 (E.D. Mich. 2005) ("[A]lthough open 
access to the Courts is essential, . . . at a certain point, a '[c]ourt's goal of fairly dispensing justice 
becomes compromised when [it] is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of 
repetitious and frivolous requests."' (quoting Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 17 (1991) (per 
curiam)); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1396 (1992) ("These observers [including many judges and some writers] 
contended that lawyers and litigants were filing a substantial number of civil cases, too few of 
which had merit."). 
36 D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on 
the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 35, 35 (1988) 
("[T]here seems to be an emerging consensus that federal civil procedure is in the midst of a 
counterrevolution . . . .  "). 
37 Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1993). 
38 Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, in THE PouND CONFER­
ENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 51, 61 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler 
eds., 1979). 
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In 1983, Rule 16 was amended to empower judges to manage liti­
gation more actively during the pretrial phase and to pare off merit­
less claims as they saw fit.39 Many judges obliged, using pretrial case 
management techniques to expedite proceedings, impose sanctions for 
abusive conduct, and coax parties toward settlement.40 Rule 11 was 
amended that same year to make sanctions mandatory and to elimi­
nate the "good-faith" standard for judging the prefiling inquiry that 
supports the allegations in a pleading.41 Changes in this and other as­
pects of the rule could chill some litigants from bringing meritorious 
claims.42 In fact, it is by now commonly felt that prior to the amend­
ment to its current form in the early 1990s, Rule 11 was disproportion­
ately used to sanction plaintiffs' counsel in civil rights actions.43 
39 FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(2) ("[T)he court may consider and take appropriate action on the 
following matters: formulating and simplifying the issues, and eliminating frivolous claims or 
defenses . . . .  "). 
40 Tobias, supra note 35, at 1396 ("Many judges participated more actively in expediting 
dispute resolution. They used pretrial conferences to set lawsuits' pace, to structure questions at 
issue, or to foster settlement, concomitantly experimenting with Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)."). 
41 See FED. R. Crv. P. 11, 28 U. S.C. app. 575 (1988) (amended 2007); FED. R. Crv. P. 11 
advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendments ("The new language is intended to reduce the 
reluctance of courts to impose sanctions . . . .  "). Rule 11 was amended in 2007 to put the imposi­
tion of sanctions within the discretion of the court once again. See FED. R. Crv. P. ll(c). 
42 Cf Yamamoto, supra note 8, at 397 ("A rule structured to deter all frivolous filings may 
be neutral by its terms and nevertheless partial in its effects. Certain types of potential litigants 
may be more severely impacted because their social situation generates disproportionate num­
bers of claims deemed frivolous by current norms."). 
43 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Exam­
ple of Rule 11,  137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1938 (1989) ("We also know that for the same one-year 
period [June 30, 1987, through July 1, 1988) in the Third Circuit, Rule 11 had a disproportion­
ately adverse impact on civil rights plaintiffs, in that civil rights plaintiffs, their lawyers, or both 
were sanctioned at a rate (47.1 %) far higher than the rate for plaintiffs as a whole (15.9%), and 
higher still than the rate for plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8.45%)."); see also Danielle Kie 
Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its 
Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 
12-13 (2002) ("Several informal and formal studies of Rule 11 were conducted. The early stud­
ies found that plaintiffs were sanctioned much more frequently than defendants, particularly in 
civil rights cases." (footnote omitted)). But see id. at 13-15 ("More recent studies provide some­
what conflicting information . . . .  In one study, conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 1990 
(the "FJC study"), federal district court judges were questioned. In another study, conducted by 
the American Judicature Society and published in 1992 (the "AJS study"), attorneys practicing 
in three federal circuits were surveyed . . . .  [T)he FJC study, which focused on federal district 
court judges' reactions to Rule 11, concluded that sanctions were sought more often against 
plaintiffs than defendants and that motions for sanctions against plaintiffs were more likely to be 
granted than those against defendants. The FJC study also concluded, however, that civil rights 
plaintiffs were not disproportionately impacted by Rule 11. Like the FJC study, the AJS study 
also found that plaintiffs and their counsel were the target of Rule 11 sanction activity to a far 
greater extent than defendants and their counsel. Unlike the FJC study, however, the AJS study 
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The history of the imposition of heightened pleading standards to 
frustrate the prosecution of certain types of cases, most notably anti­
trust and civil rights claims,44 has also been well documented.45 Al­
though the Supreme Court had steadfastly rejected this practice,46 
more recently-as a result of its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly47 and Ashcroft v. lqba/48-the Court has signaled that its 
commitment to notice pleading has waned.49 Congress has even got-
concluded that civil rights cases were disproportionately impacted by Rule 11." (footnotes 
omitted)). 
44 Professor Roy Brooks has commented as follows on the phenomenon of heightened 
pleading in the civil-rights context: 
From a [Critical Race Theory] perspective, application of any heightened pleading 
standard to civil rights cases constitutes racial subordination. The heightened 
pleading standard disadvantages the civil rights plaintiff by imposing the difficult, if 
not impossible, burden of making specific factual allegations about events known 
only to the defendant. The defendant is not required to disclose this information to 
the plaintiff until discovery, yet the plaintiff is forced to plead such unknown facts 
to prevent the dismissal of her civil rights claim. The heightened pleading standard, 
therefore, means that civil rights plaintiffs are required to plead facts that non-civil 
rights plaintiffs are not expected to know prior to discovery. 
Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 
11 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 107 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
45 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 987, 988 
(2003); see also Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance 
in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII 
Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv. 211, 243-52 (1992). 
46 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U. S. 506, 512 (2002) ("(I]mposing the Court of 
Appeals' heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with Fed­
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include only 'a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."'); Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 168 (1993) ("We think 
that it is impossible to square the 'heightened pleading standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in 
this case with the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules."); Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claim­
ant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim."); see also Pratt v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 
730 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting heightened pleading standard in prisoner civil-rights case based in 
part on the foregoing Supreme Court cases). But see Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 
347 (2005) ("We concede that ordinary pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden 
upon a plaintiff. But it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an eco­
nomic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that 
the plaintiff has in mind." (citation omitted)). 
47 Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
48 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
49 Id. at 1950 (articulating a need, at the pleading stage, for factual allegations that "plausi­
bly" suggest entitlement to relief). Opinions differ on the import of Twombly, although there 
seems to be some support for the notion that it has had a predictably adverse impact on prospec­
tive civil rights claims. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Con­
ley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99, passim (2008) (hereinafter Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims] 
(discussing post-Twombly treatment of civil rights complaints); see also Kendall W. Hannon, 
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ten involved; in passing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995,50 it imposed heightened pleading standards on claimants as­
serting securities-fraud claims.51 Beyond stricter pleading standards, 
plaintiffs still face difficulty in having amendments to those pleadings 
relate back when they seek to change unknown defendants to identi­
fied defendants,52 a rule that seems to impact victims of alleged law­
enforcement misconduct the most.53 Those claimants making it to the 
summary judgment stage face significant hurdles as well, particularly 
in light of the ease with which defendants may raise such challenges in 
the wake of the Celotex trilogy of cases.54 Indeed, if the amendments 
Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 
12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1811, 1815 (2008) ("(T]he one area in which this 
study does show a significant departure from previous dismissal practice is the civil rights field." 
(emphasis omitted)). Professor Bone, however, argues that the change wrought by Twombly is 
not as dramatic as others, including myself, have suggested. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading 
Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IowA L. REv. 873, 878 (2009) ("Twombly's plead­
ing standard neither signals a return to code fact pleading nor represents a sharp break from the 
vision of the 1938 Federal Rule drafters, as some critics have argued."). I propound the view 
that Twombly works a major change in pleading doctrine in Plausibility Pleading, supra note 3, at 
49, and touch on Professor Bone's views in Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REv. 
1, 24 (2009). 
so Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified at 18 U. S.C. § 1964 and in scattered sections of 15 U. S.C.). 
51 See 15 U. S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)-(2) (2006); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" 
(in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 60 (1998) ("The strict 
pleading requirement of the [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act] . . .  is designed to favor 
defendants over plaintiffs in securities lawsuits, not to implement some carefully planned vision 
of the procedural system."). 
52 See, e.g., Bell v. City of Topeka, 279 F. App'x 689, 692 (10th Cir. 2008) ("(A] plaintiff's 
designation of an unknown defendant . . .  in the original complaint is not a formal defect of the 
type (Rule 15(c)(l)(C)] was meant to address, and a later amendment that specifically names 
that defendant does not relate back to the original complaint." (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)); see also Moore v. Tennessee, 267 F. App'x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) ("In this 
court, a plaintiff's lack of knowledge pertaining to an intended defendant's identity does not 
constitute a 'mistake concerning the party's identity' within the meaning of Rule 15(c)."). The 
Moore court cited cases from seven other circuit courts that were in accord with its judgment. 
See id. 
53 Many may recall how this interpretation of the relation-back rule prevented an alleged 
victim of police brutality from bringing suit against named police officers in Worthington v. Wil­
son, 790 F. Supp. 829, 834-35 (C.D. Ill. 1992), affd, 8 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993). 
54 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 (1986), the Supreme Court held that there is no 
requirement that a "moving party support its motion (for summary judgment] with affidavits or 
other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 323. In Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242 (1986), the Court held that the substantive evidentiary standard of 
proof applicable at trial applies to the summary judgment decision. Id. at 252. The third case in 
the trilogy, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986), stated 
that "if the factual context renders respondents' claim implausible-if the claim is one that sim­
ply makes no economic sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence 
to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary." Id. at 587. Although these decisions 
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to Rule 56 currently under consideration55 take effect in their current 
form, plaintiffs may face even more difficulty and expense in resisting 
the termination of their case on summary judgment.56 
On the class-action front, plaintiffs have faced challenging class­
certification standards for classes seeking primarily money damages. 
For example, Rule 23(b ) (3) requires that common questions of law or 
fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class mem­
bers57 and multistate classes requiring the application of disparate 
state legal rules typically will not pass that test.58 Further, the costs of 
proceeding as a class seeking money damages may at times be prohibi­
tive given the plaintiffs' obligation to pay for notice to class mem­
bers.59 That federal class-certification standards are stringent60 has 
been recognized by Congress, which cited those strict standards as a 
primary rationale for moving more putative classes from state into 
would tend to make summary judgment motions easier to assert and more daunting for plain­
tiffs, a study by the Federal Judicial Center claims that there is not much evidence supporting the 
idea that the Celotex trilogy led to an increase in such motions. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter­
Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
Snm. 861, 906 (2007). 
55 See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF U.S., REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES 26 AND 56 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 21-56 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ 
CV _Report.pdf. The proposed amendments include a revision to the process surrounding Rule 
56 motions, referred to as a "point-counterpoint procedure." Id. at 24. 
56 See Letter from Stephen B. Burbank, Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law School, to 
Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, at 2, 6-8 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008%20Comments 
%20Committee % 20Folders/CV%20Comments %202008/08-CV-145-Comment-Burbank. pdf 
(pointing out the potential problems of cost, delay, frustration of the jury right, and strategic 
gamesmanship that could flow from imposition of the point-counterpoint procedure proposed in 
amended Rule 56). 
57 See, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The predominance 
element requires a finding that common issues of law or fact 'predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.' [Rule 23(b)(3).] This requirement, although reminiscent of 
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), is 'far more demanding' because it 'tests whether 
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.'" (quoting 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 623-24 (1997))). 
58 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 460-62 (E.D. La. 2006). 
59 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974) (holding that "[w]here . . .  
the relationship between the parties is truly adversary, the plaintiff must pay for the cost of 
notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit"). 
60 See, e.g. , In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) 
("Class certification requires a finding that each of the requirements of Rule 23 has been met. 
Factual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of 
the evidence. In other words, to certify a class the district court must find that the evidence 
more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23." (foot­
note and citations omitted)). 
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federal court through the Class Action Fairness Act61 passed in 2005.62 
Ultimately, a restrictive interpretation of class-certification standards 
tends to preclude classes from proceeding to a resolution of their 
claims on the merits.63 
Certainly, efforts to constrain discovery, most notably through 
amending Rule 26 to limit the scope of discovery to material related 
to claims or defenses in the action rather than the subject matter of 
the action, reflect a desire to discourage "fishing expeditions" that. 
might yield additional claims and to protect litigants-mainly defend­
ants-against the high costs associated with complex discovery. These 
efforts were spurred in part by longstanding concerns about "preda­
tory discovery"64 or "discovery abuse"65-the perception that plain­
tiffs were using their ability to impose discovery costs on their 
opponents as a means of coercing them into early settlements.66 Al­
though the Supreme Court at one time seemed to endorse the idea 
61 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 ( codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U. S.C.). 
62 See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 6 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7 ("This Commit­
tee believes that the current diversity and removal standards as applied in interstate class actions 
have facilitated a parade of abuses . . . .  "); id. at 14, 2005 U. S.C.C.A.N. at 14 ("[ S]ome state court 
judges are less careful than their federal court counterparts about applying the procedural re­
quirements that govern class actions."); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 233, 246 (2007) (criticizing Congress for, through the Class Action 
Fairness Act, "indulging its anti-federalist impulses to impose on the judicial authority of states 
based on its dissatisfaction with the results that state courts were producing when they adjudi­
cated state law claims over which they properly had jurisdiction "). 
63 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 
W,s. L. REv. 631, 655 (1994) ("In a class action involving a large group whose members claim 
only a small harm was inflicted on each of them, virtually the only important judicial ruling is 
whether to certify the class under Rule 23, a decision that occurs without even a glance at the 
merits."). 
64 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (en 
bane), rev'd, 470 U. S. 373 (1985). 
65 SEcnON OF LITIG., AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE 
STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE 1 (1977). 
66 See William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the 
Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978) ("Unnecessary intrusions 
into the privacy of the individual, high costs to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of 
the discovery process as a lever toward settlement have come to be part of some lawyers' trial 
strategy."); see also ACF Indus., Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U. S. 1081, 1086-87 (1979) (Powell, J., dis­
senting from denial of certiorari) ("[T]he widespread abuse of discovery . . .  is a prime cause of 
delay and expense in civil litigation . . . .  [U]ntil rule changes can be made, there is a pressing 
need for judicial supervision in this area."); Marrese, 726 F.2d at 1161 ("[W]e may not ignore as 
judges what we know as lawyers-that discovery of sensitive documents is sometimes sought not 
to gather evidence that will help the party seeking discovery to prevail on the merits of his case 
but to coerce his opponent to settle regardless of the merits rather than have to produce the 
documents."). 
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that "fishing expeditions" were allowed under the discovery rules,67 
lower courts68 and even the Supreme Court itself69 seem to have set­
tled on the contrary view. The new electronic-discovery rules, which 
permit producing parties to withhold information that is not reasona­
bly accessible and allow the sharing of costs associated with burden­
some production,70 reflect a prioritization of cost control over the 
interests of accurate resolution of disputes.71 
Finally, the restrictive ethos finds a voice in jurisdictional rules 
and doctrines. Personal jurisdiction doctrine seems tilted against 
plaintiffs given its excessive concern with convenience to defendants72 
and tendency to preclude plaintiffs from bringing cases against out-of­
state defendants in the plaintiffs' home state where they may have 
been harmed, particularly in the Internet context.73 Aspects of federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction are access-restrictive as well. Although di­
versity jurisdiction in some ways has expanded (such as, in a back­
handed way, via the Class Action Fairness Act74 or the corporate-
67 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 507 (1947) ("[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be 
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedi­
tion' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case."). 
68 E.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597 (1st Cir. 1980) 
("As a threshold matter, the court should be satisfied that a claim is not frivolous, a pretense for 
using discovery powers in a fishing expedition. In this case, plaintiff should show that it can 
establish jury issues on the essential elements of its case not the subject of the contested 
discovery."). 
69 See Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) ("[P)roceeding to antitrust 
discovery can be expensive . . . .  '[A) district court must retain the power to insist upon some 
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed."' 
(quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983))). 
70 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
71 Although the cost concerns associated with the production of inaccessible electronically 
stored information are valid, the question is whether a rule that presumptively protects such 
information against production will have an unfair adverse impact on litigants' access to the 
information they need to make their case. 
72 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. Ctt1. L. 
REv. 617, 618 (2006) (describing personal jurisdiction doctrine as "a confused defendant-centric 
doctrine obsessed with defendants' intentions, expectations, and experiences of inconvenience"). 
73 See, e.g. , Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258-59 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
effort of plaintiff to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state newspaper allegedly placing 
defamatory content on its universally available website because the Connecticut newspaper did 
not "aim [its) website or the posted articles at a Virginia audience"). Compare the prevailing 
American approach to Internet jurisdiction-which favors defendants-with the approach in 
Australia, which permits a clearly more claimant-oriented approach to personal jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 606-07 (stating that victims of defama­
tion may bring claims in the jurisdiction "at the place where the damage to reputation occurs" 
and that in the Internet context the damage to reputation is done where the claimant downloads 
the injurious material). 
74 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
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citizenship rule75) ,  the amount-in-controversy requirement continues 
to be increased periodically to exclude smaller claims from federal 
court. Additionally, the doors of the federal courts are closed com­
pletely to those seeking a federal forum for the enforcement of child­
or spousal-support obligations even though such disputes otherwise 
might qualify for diversity jurisdiction.76 It is also worth noting that 
appellate-court jurisdiction was recently restricted by treating a statu­
tory time limit for appeal as jurisdictional, preventing a plaintiff who 
had relied on a district-court extension beyond the time limit from 
having his appeal heard.77 
In sum, from this cursory survey of contemporary civil procedure 
and its major pressure points we can see that a collection of procedu­
ral rules and reforms reflect a restrictive ethos, characterized by a de­
sire to discourage certain claims and to keep systemic litigation costs 
under control. 
Ill. Resolving the Tension: A Dialectical Analysis 
As we have seen, there are two sides to civil procedure. The first 
is access-promoting and favors resolution of disputes on the merits. 
The other is more restrictive and cost-conscious, creating various doc­
trines that frustrate the assertion and prosecution of potentially meri­
torious claims. In other words, much of procedure is expressly 
directed not at the traditional goal of facilitating accurate outcomes, 
but rather is designed and applied to frustrate or at least subordinate 
accuracy in certain contexts where efficiency of some sort or the inter­
ests of certain litigants are at stake. 
75 The corporate-citizenship rule holds that a corporation is only a citizen of its state of 
incorporation and the state where it has its principal place of business for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction. 28 U. S.C. § 1332(c)(l) (2006); see also Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v, 
Letson, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 497 (1844) (holding that a corporation's citizenship is determined inde­
pendently of the citizenship of its owners). This rule enabled corporations to gain greater access 
to the thought-to-be-more-hospitable federal courts. The rule correspondingly limited the abil­
ity of the adversaries of corporations to proceed against them in state courts. 
76 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, 695, 703 (1992) (noting that "the Constitution 
does not exclude domestic relations cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by statute to 
the federal courts" but indicating that such cases are excluded based on an interpretation of the 
federal diversity statute). For criticism of the domestic-relations exception, see generally Jill 
Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998); Judith 
Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1682 (1991). 
77 Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007) ("Bowles' failure to file his notice of 
appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. 
And because Bowles' error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on forfeiture or 
waiver to excuse his lack of compliance with the statute's time limitations."). 
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These two sides of procedure coexist, although their opposing 
tendencies create a tension that cries for resolution. Resolution of 
this tension may be found in realizing that the liberal ethos and the 
restrictive ethos are dialectically related. That is, the basic thesis of 
procedure, its liberal ethos, yields its antithesis, the restrictive ethos, 
and the two can be reconciled through a synthesis that helps us under­
stand how these seemingly contradictory attitudes cooperate toward a 
unified, more fundamental goal. 
Professor Subrin has already demonstrated how the liberal as­
pects of civil procedure-which are primarily rooted in historical eq­
uity practices-resulted in a system that so favored access that certain 
observers felt the need to introduce the array of access-restricting re­
forms discussed above.78 That is, the pursuit and realization of the 
liberal ethos is the very thing that generates its antithesis, the restric­
tive ethos; the goals promoted by the liberal ethos generate a systemic 
need for counter-values that can address the challenging or burden­
some products of the liberal procedural ideal. Greater access to 
courts naturally increases the volume of litigation the system must 
handle and presents a greater opportunity to put forth claims asserting 
seemingly tenuous or disfavored rights. Seeking the resolution of dis­
putes on their merits requires permitting parties a degree of freedom 
in asserting and establishing their claims that can subject adversaries 
and the courts to lengthy and expensive processes and proceedings. 
The costs and burdens seemingly imposed on courts and defending 
parties by the liberal ethos gives rise to a collection of counter-values 
that seek to suppress the volume of claims and facilitate courts' ability 
to manage and dispose of claims sooner and more efficiently than a 
truly merits-centered system might allow.79 In sum, access, simplicity, 
and affordability generate an overwhelming volume of (to some, un-
78 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982 (1987) (noting that "recent 
trends to amend the Federal Rules as well as the developments in alternative dispute resolution 
have emerged, at least in considerable part, in response to the chaos" caused by the equitable 
nature of the rules, which "permitted the participation of virtually unlimited numbers of people 
in trials and the consideration of a similar array of theories and facts"). 
79 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 13, at 537-38 ("Arguably, the very success of these efforts 
to effect the 1938 Rules were what created the counterrevolution of the late Twentieth Century's 
discovery reform movements."). 
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desirable) litigation activity80 that restrictive values are designed to 
suppress. 81 
So on one level, the synthesis of the liberal ethos and the restric­
tive ethos might be in the nature of a checks-and-balances relation­
ship: the restrictive ethos checks the excesses of the liberal ethos and 
vice versa. I believe, however, there is more to it than that. Although 
the checks-and-balances concept might accurately describe the rela­
tionship between the liberal and restrictive aspects of civil procedure 
in some respects, in reality it seems that the liberal ethos is in many 
respects overshadowed by the restrictive.82 That is, although one can 
identify those liberal aspects of procedure in contemporary rules and 
doctrines, the restrictive ethos in procedure appears ascendant and 
poised for dominance. The Supreme Court's capitulation to defen­
dant requests for more stringent pleading standards in Bell Altantic 
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal is the clearest evidence of 
procedure's tilt towards restrictiveness. In Twombly, the Court was 
unashamed to cite discovery abuse as a ground for preventing plain­
tiffs from proceeding to discovery on the basis of equivocal pleading 
that might have satisfied Conley v. Gibson's "no set of facts" stan­
dard.83 In light of the zeal with which lower courts have embraced a 
restrictive interpretation of Twombly,84 and the Court's reinforcement 
of restrictive pleading standards in Iqbal,85 many litigants now face a 
potentially substantial obstacle to accessing the system to assert their 
claims. The Class Action Fairness Act, the narrow view of personal 
80 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEM­
MAS: PURSUING PuBuc GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 49 (2000) ("(A]ny change in court processes 
that provides more efficient means of litigating is likely to enable more litigation. Greater effi­
ciency can lower the costs of bringing lawsuits, making it more attractive for litigants to sue and 
for lawyers to take their cases."); Subrin, supra note 78, at 912, 944 (arguing that the prevalence 
of equity procedure within the Federal Rules "represents a major contributing factor to many of 
the most pressing problems in contemporary civil procedure" and that "courts continue to live 
with the chaotic results of this uncontrolled and uncontrolling procedural system"). 
81 Professor Yamamoto described the obstructionist perspective on the suppression of un­
desirable litigation well when he wrote, "From a utilitarian perspective, some indignity suffered 
by a minority of the populace (denied access to the courts] is an unavoidable and tolerable result 
of system shrinkage in the interest of efficiency." Yamamoto, supra note 8, at 390. 
82 This observation echoes that of Professor Walker, who recently opined that various 
common-law procedural doctrines, the so-called "Other Rules" of civil procedure, "interact with 
the 1938 Rules in such a way as to counter the apparent progressive character of the 1938 Rules 
and produce a functioning system which is not progressive in reality but conservative." Walker, 
supra note 33, at 80-81 (footnote omitted). 
83 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967-69 (2007). 
84 See Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 49, at 141-55. 
85 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) ("[O]nly a complaint that states a plausi­
ble claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965)). 
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jurisdiction in the Internet context, the discovery-scope amendment, 
and limitations on the discovery of burdensome electronically stored 
information all additionally evince the dominance of restrictiveness, 
and together reflect the culmination of a move toward restrictiveness 
begun with the counter-revolutionary changes to Rule 16, Rule 11, 
and summary judgment that appeared only a generation ago.86 
Given the simultaneous presence of a dominant restrictive ethos 
and the visible vestiges of the liberal ethos within civil procedure, I 
would describe the synthesis of the two not merely as a checks-and­
balances relationship. Rather, the restrictive ethos enables the civil 
justice system to survive by reducing the number of disfavored actions 
that burden the system while the more popularly known liberal ethos 
takes on the role of generating and sustaining the legitimacy of, and 
faith in, the civil justice system in the eyes of the public at large. In 
other words, procedure's central thesis (the liberal ethos) and antithe­
sis ( the restrictive ethos) can be synthesized into a concept I refer to 
as ordered dominance: procedure's overarching, unified goal is to fa­
cilitate and validate the substantive outcomes desired by society's 
dominant interests; procedure's veneer of fairness and neutrality 
maintains support for the system while its restrictive doctrines weed 
out disfavored actions asserted by members of social out-groups and 
ensure desired results.87 
By "dominant interests" I mean the commercial class that uses 
the courts to litigate traditional claims such as contract or property 
86 Of course, restrictive impulses within the Federal Rules did not originate entirely within 
the past thirty years. The drafters were aware of the breadth of the system that they were creat­
ing and included measures such as the summary judgment device as one way to hold the line 
against the tenuous claims that their liberal pleading rules might allow. See Stephen B .  Burbank, 
Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or 
Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL Snm. 591, 603 (2004) ("Rule 56 was intended to function as 
an equilibrating device that would discipline the results of notice pleading and profit from those 
of broad discovery."). By emphasizing the more recent developments in the direction of restric­
tiveness, I simply mean to suggest that explicit commitment to the restrictive ethos appears to 
have, over time, intensified, gained strength, and come to dominate those provisions that would 
otherwise be access-promoting in the Federal Rules. 
87 As I explain below, I do not define the conflict between dominant interests and social 
out-groups in purely racialized, black-white terms, although others have done so. See, e.g., 
Brooks, supra note 44, at 1 1 1  ("Society and its institutions, including its legal system, express a 
white world-view, a perspective that necessarily operates to the benefit of whites at the expense 
of people of color. The federal courts' treatment of civil rights claims, including Rule 11 sanc­
tions, is merely further evidence of this built-in bias." (footnote omitted)). Racial minorities 
asserting certain claims certainly fit within the out-group category but other groups, not defined 
simply by race (e.g., women, gays, the elderly, consumers, small investors), fall within this cate­
gory as well. 
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disputes, or who encounter the courts as civil defendants in all kinds 
of disputes. This group is important to the national economy and has 
the means and clout to influence policymakers at all levels of govern­
ment. Civil procedure tends to favor the interests of these groups by 
keeping restrictive procedural doctrines (such as heightened pleading) 
from interfering with the resolution of ordinary commercial disputes88 
and by protecting commercial defendants against claims by members 
of various out-groups. 
By "out-groups" I mean "those outside the political and cultural 
mainstream, particularly those challenging accepted legal principles 
and social norms. . . . [T]hose raising difficult and often tenuous 
claims that demand the reordering of established political, economic 
and social arrangements, that is, those at the system's and society's 
margins."89 Dominant interests retain control over the mechanisms 
that control civil procedure, namely the federal judiciary and deriva­
tively the membership of the federal rulemaking committees.90 In 
turn, those controlling the development of procedure since the 197Os 
have tended to prefer anti-access reforms that stymie the efforts of 
social out-groups to use the federal courts to vindicate their inter­
ests.91 These anti-access reforms-particularly stricter pleading and 
looser summary judgment standards-favor pretrial dispositions that 
ultimately keep resolution of these claims out of the hands of repre­
sentative juries and firmly within the control of judicial elites. 
88 Yamamoto, supra note 8, at 345 ("(The) procedural system (is] hospitable to litigants 
with disputes involving well-settled legal principles."). 
89 Id. (footnote omitted). 
90 It is worth noting that since the appointment of Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1969, 
the Chief Justices-and thus the persons in control of the membership of the various rulemaking 
committees-have been appointed by Republican presidents, who have tended to support litiga­
tion-reform efforts more than the interests of pro-plaintiff trial attorneys and consumer groups. 
See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the 
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1899 (2008) ("During Reagan's 
presidency, Republicans introduced 'tort reform' bills in Congress with increasing frequency 
.... "); Stephen Labaton, Bush Calls for Change in Handling Asbestos Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
8, 2005, at Al2. Professor Burbank points out that the civil-rules committee is dominated by 
judges rather than members of the bar, an imbalance that might put too heavy a thumb on the 
scale in favor of institutional interests that may favor only certain kinds of procedural reform. 
See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 1677, 1714-15 (2004) ("Under Chief Justice Warren Burger, however, the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee came to be heavily dominated by judges selected by the Chief Justice. This 
imbalance has continued .. .. "). 
91 Yamamoto, supra note 8, at 345 ("Reforms that discourage court access for minorities 
asserting 'marginal' rights claims reflect value judgments about the purposes of adjudication and 
the desirability of broad-based participation in the litigation process."). 
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The idea of "disfavored actions" is already familiar. Allegations 
of fraud have been treated as disfavored for various reasons and thus 
the Federal Rules have always required that such claims be pleaded 
with particularity.92 Other actions have been "disfavored" as well; 
malicious prosecution, civil rights claims, securities claims, and anti­
trust claims have been treated by various courts throughout the his­
tory of the Federal Rules as disfavored and thus warranting a 
heightened pleading standard.93 Such claims have been singled out for 
disproportionate scrutiny under Rule 11 as well.94 Employment dis­
crimination claims also seem to be disfavored given that summary 
judgment motions by defendants in such cases are relatively more 
likely to succeed.95 
The idea of ordered dominance that I have described is certainly 
an oversimplification and likely fails to describe the whole of civil pro­
cedure accurately. However, it cannot be gainsaid that procedure to­
day is recognized by all the relevant players-the rulemakers, the 
judiciary, members of Congress, interested lobbyists-as being vitally 
connected with substantive policy interests and that some of those 
same players have consciously tinkered with ( or manipulated) proce­
dural rules or doctrines with a clear understanding of their likely im­
pact on certain substantive policy ends.96 Given that fact, it does not 
take much more investigation to reach the ordered-dominance thesis; 
none of the aforementioned players represent members of societal 
out-groups but rather are drawn from or represent privileged elites.97 
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: Civ1L § 1296 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing, inter alia, the considerations 
that lead to the adoption of heightened pleading standards). 
93 See Marcus, supra note 2, at 471-72 
94 Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988) ("Rule 11 is 
being used disproportionately against plaintiffs, particularly in certain types of litigation such as 
civil rights [cases], employment discrimination [cases], securities fraud cases brought by inves­
tors, and antitrust cases brought by small companies."). 
95 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 103, 128 (2009) ("[P]retrial adju­
dication particularly disfavors employment discrimination plaintiffs."); cf Cecil et al., supra note 
54, at 886-89 (noting the rise of summary judgment grants to defendants in civil rights cases, 
which presumably include employment discrimination claims). 
96 See Burbank, supra note 90, at 1703--06 ( describing Congress's increasing involvement 
in tinkering with civil procedure as it came to understand procedure's impact on its substantive 
policy goals); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Pro­
gress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 771-76 (1993) (discussing politicization of procedure and the 
"hidden agendas" of some rule reformers who seek to further their own substantive interests 
through civil-litigation reform). 
97 For example, a cursory look at the membership of the current Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, which is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Members_List_07 _2009.pdf, 
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Although some among this group may fight for the interests of the 
out-groups when waging procedural battles, the restrictive regulatory 
and doctrinal outputs of procedural reform do not reveal much evi­
dence in support of such a notion. To the contrary, modem procedu­
ral reforms, either through rulemaking, congressional intervention, or 
judicial interpretation, have bent towards the restrictive ethos, which 
undeniably has favored society's dominant interests as defined above. 
Conclusion 
Many may chafe at the idea of ordered dominance, given its 
seeming inconsistency with our traditional rhetoric of fair play, due 
process, and a day in court. Indeed, members of societal out-groups 
who are disadvantaged by the contemporary procedural regime may 
find the suggestion that civil procedure's restrictive ethos dominates 
its advertised liberal components particularly disheartening. But de­
spondency is not the proper response to developing an understanding 
of the regime of ordered dominance revealed above. To the contrary, 
enlightenment is empowering; with a clear view of procedure one can 
articulate and advocate for appropriate reforms or, more likely, resist 
those reforms that are likely to further entrench the regime of ordered 
dominance. 
Beyond enlightenment and empowerment, there is additional 
cause for hope. The concepts of access, fairness, and accuracy are 
powerful and deeply held ideals that likely enjoy universal public sup­
port. As long as these ideals remain part of the overall procedural 
scheme-whether as mere rhetoric or as actual working principles­
there is a base from which more progressive reformers can argue that 
beneath the rhetoric of litigation abuses and explosions lay individual 
litigants with grievances that have a right to be heard. The American 
commitment to justice and fairness can form a wellspring of devotion 
to the ideal that those who have been wronged should have access to a 
system that will right those wrongs and the belief that substantive 
rights should not be smoldered simply by the conniving of procedure. 
The challenge is to translate these popular notions into procedural re­
alities, particularly in the context of a court system that has limited 
time and resources to afford all civil disputants any and every 
reveals the presence of only one plaintiffs' attorney and one judge who was appointed to the 
bench by a Democrat. Defense lawyers, former prosecutors, and Republican-appointed judges 
(a good number of whom clerked for Chief Justice Rehnquist) dominate the committee. 
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procedural opportunity they might wish to enjoy. In time, perhaps, 
like all historical regimes, procedure's empire of ordered dominance 
too will come to an end. 
